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THE RIGHT TO REFUSE LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT IN CALIFORNIA: WHO SHOULD
DECIDE AND BY WHAT STANDARD?
I. INTRODUCTION
The progression of modern medical technology has erased
the bright line of distinction between life and death. Through
the use of various equipment, physicians are now able to artifi-
cially prolong human life beyond its natural limit. Thus, a deci-
sion to terminate or forego life-sustaining treatment is a choice
between life and death and should be carefully regulated.
In California, the legislation now in effect allows a person
to create a "living will"' and to appoint another person to
make health care decisions if he should become incompetent
or terminally ill.2 In the recent past, these legislative acts were
hampered by self-imposed requirements and restrictions which
limited their applicability to a narrow class of persons in speci-
fied circumstances.' Recent revisions to these acts have elimi-
nated many of these restrictions- and have broadened the
group of people to which the acts are applicable.
Current case law in California has established a virtually
absolute right to refuse medical treatment, including
life-sustaining measures,4 but there is limited legislation to
protect and enforce this right. Specifically, the current legisla-
tion fails to address two categories of patients: (1) the fully
competent patients who are not terminally ill, but decide to
forego life-sustaining treatment; and (2) the patients who are
rendered incompetent before they have been able to clearly
express their desires. The lack of legislation in this area has
forced the determination of these issues on the already over-
burdened California court system.
Absent the existence of legislation, the courts have given
extreme deference to the decisions of competent patients to
1. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1992).
2. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1992).
3. See infra notes 6-24 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 75-85 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 3356
and accompanying text and infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
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terminate their own life-sustaining treatment. However, in the
haste to establish absolute personal autonomy, the lives of
conscious patients making ill- considered decisions have been
sacrificed. To remedy this, legislation is needed to ensure that
the patient's decision is rational, firm and not overly influ-
enced by the opinions of others.
Additionally, a California court has held that the right to
refuse medical treatment survives incompetence and may be
exercised on the incompetent patient's behalf by a surrogate.'
However, there are no legislative safeguards specifying who
may act as a surrogate and the standard by which the surro-
gate must make his decision.
Without safeguards, restrictions and standards, the poten-
tial abuse in the termination of life-sustaining treatment is
extremely high. The consequence of a patient or surrogate's
decision to withdraw life-sustaining measures is death. The
irreversible nature of death and the state's interest in preserv-
ing life mandate the need for legislation. This comment pro-
poses standards and tests that should be enacted to protect the
right of both competent and incompetent patients to not have
their lives artificially prolonged, if that is what the patient de-
sires.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutes
The California Legislature responded to the need for
guidance in the area of death and dying by enacting two stat-
utes: the Natural Death Act6 and the Durable Power of Attor-
ney for Heath Care7. In their original forms these statutes had
requirements and restrictions which severely limited their ap-
plicability. However, recent revisions which took effect January
1, 1992 have removed some of the restrictions, thereby broad-
ening the range of circumstances in which the statutes could
be beneficial.
In 1976, the California Natural Death Act was incorporat-
ed into the Health and Safety Code.8 The "legislature [found]
5. See infra notes 86-98.
6. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 1, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6274 (West) (re-
pealed 1991).
7. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1992).
8. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 1, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6274 (West) (re-
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that adult persons have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care,
including the decision to have life- sustaining procedures with-
held or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition."9 The
Act was the first of its kind in the nation. Although it was
considered quite radical at the time it was adopted, the Act
proved to be very limited in its application.
The Act established the procedure, commonly known as a
"living will," which is used by patients to indicate their desire
to execute a Natural Death Directive." To qualify under the
repealed Act a patient had to have his condition diagnosed as
terminal by two physicians12 at least fourteen days prior to the
execution of the directive. 3 In addition, the directive was only
valid for five years from the date of execution. 4 There were
several restrictions regarding the witnessing and signing of the
directive, including the requirement that both witnesses were
not related to the patient and would not benefit from the
patient's estate." Although the Act did recognize that certain
individuals in limited circumstances had the ability to enforce
their decision to forego life-sustaining treatment, its many
pealed 1991).
9. Id. The legislation recognized that the artificial "prolongation of life for
persons with a terminal condition may cause loss of patient dignity and unneces-
sary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial
to the patient." Id.
10. See Matthew C. Ainley, Comment, Discontinuing Treatment of Comatose Pa-
tients Who Have Signed Living Wills. 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 61, 82 (1985).
11. Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 1, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6274, 6275
(West) (repealed 1991). This section contained a form that had to be used in a
valid living will, as well as the procedure necessary to effectuate it. The document
had to be signed by the patient and state the patient's desires had he been ren-
dered incompetent. Id. In the repealed Act, the directive allowed an adult person
to instruct "his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the
event of a terminal condition." Id. at 6274.
12. Id. at 6275-76. The legislation defined a terminal condition as "an incur-
able condition . . . which . . . [would] produce death, and where application of
life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the pa-
tient." Id. at 6275.
13. Id. at 6275-76.
14. Id. at 6276.
15. Id. at 6275-76. Neither the treating physician nor his employees could act
as a witness. Id. Additionally, the directive could not be executed by a patient in
a nursing home unless one of the witnesses was a patient advocate or ombudsman
designated by the State Department of Aging. Id. at 6276.
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requirements and restrictions did little to lessen the amount of
litigation.
The revised Natural Death Act"6 was introduced as Senate
Bill 980 and was signed by Governor Pete Wilson on October
12, 1991. The new Act has essentially the same purpose as the
Act it repealed: It allows patients to communicate their desire
to have life-sustaining procedures withdrawn through the use
of a "living will." However, the new Act increases the number
of persons who can create a directive by including patients in
instances of permanent unconscious condition, as well as pa-
tients in terminal conditions. 7 Additionally, the fourteen day
and five year restrictions of the old Act have been eliminated.
The new Act does not place any time limits on the effective-
ness of the declaration. The restrictions regarding the witness-
es have also been changed and now one of the witnesses can
be related to the patient or entitled to a portion of the
patient's estate. Furthermore, the revised Act specifically states
that the type of treatment that can be withdrawn includes "arti-
ficially administered nutrition and hydration." 8
The time and conditional restrictions found in the original
Act limited the use of a "living will" to a narrow class of per-
sons in specified circumstances. The revised Natural Death Act
allows a much greater number of people to express their de-
sire to have life-sustaining measures withdrawn and to have
these desires legally enforced. However, there are still many
situations and conditions that the Natural Death Act does not
cover.
As stated earlier, the second statute that was enacted by
the California Legislature to regulate the area of death and
dying is the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, which
is incorporated in the California Civil Code. 9 The purpose of
this power is to allow a patient to choose and appoint a person
16. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1992). This re-
pealed the Natural Death Act, ch. 1439, § 1, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6274 (West)
(repealed 1991).
17. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 7185.5(a). "The Legislature finds that an
adult person has the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the
rendering of his or her own medical care, including the decision to have
life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition
or permanent unconscious condition." Id.
18. Id. § 7186.5(b).
19. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1992).
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to make the patient's health care decisions for him/her if
he/she becomes incompetent or is diagnosed as terminally
ill." In 1983, the year it was initially enacted, this power was
significant because it allowed an attorney-in-fact to be appoint-
ed before the patient became incompetent or terminally-ill; an
act which could not be accomplished by the use of the original
Natural Death Act." Other than that main difference, the re-
quirements and restrictions present in the Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care are similar to the original and re-
vised Natural Death Act."
On October 12, 1991 Governor Pete Wilson approved
Assembly Bill 7932 in conjunction with Senate Bill 790 (which
repealed the Natural Death Act). The Assembly Bill amended
Sections 2433, 2436.5, 2444, 2500 and 2503.5 of the Civil
Code, relating to the Durable Power of Attorney for Heath
Care. The most important revision enacted by the Bill is that
the seven year limit on the duration of the power that existed
in the original act was eliminated. The new power exists for an
indefinite period of time unless specifically limited in dura-
tion."'
B. Case Law
In California case law and legislation the concept of a
right to die is derived from the right to privacy established in
20. Id. § 2430(a) which states that a "'[d]urable power of attorney for health
care' means a durable power of attorney to the extent that it authorizes an attor-
ney in fact to make health care decisions for the principal."
21. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text. However, Cal. Civ. Code
§ 2433 also issued an informational warning to the principal that "a court can
take away the power of your agent . . . if your agent (1) authorizes anything that
is illegal, (2) acts contrary to your known desires, or (3) where your desires are
not known, does anything that is clearly contrary to your best interest." Id. Thus,
the statute stipulated that the agent must use the substituted judgment and best
interest standards in making a good faith determination of which medical proce-
dures would be appropriate for the incompetent patient.
22. A similarity to the original Natural Death Act is that the execution of the
directive creating a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care must be witnessed
by at least one person who is not related to the declarant and will not benefit
from the declarant's estate. Id. § 2432(a)(3)(A).
23. Durable Powers of Attorney-Validity and Expiration, ch. 896, § 1, 1991
Cal. Legis. Serv. § 496 (West 1991) (codified in scattered sections of Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 2433-2503.5 (West 1992)).
24. Cal. Civ. Code § 2433(a).
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the amendments of the United States Constitution' 5 and Arti-
cle I of the California Constitution.26 At the federal level the
right to privacy was first recognized in a 1965 United States
Supreme Court decision, Griswold v. Connecticut27 In this land-
mark case the court found a protected zone of individual
rights penumbrating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution.28 Addi-
tionally, the Court held that these rights were not absolute,
and must be balanced against asserted state interests.2
The California Supreme Court expanded on the right to
privacy to include a right to refuse medical treatment in its
1972 decision, Cobbs v. Grant.' The Court stated that a pa-
tient could assert a battery claim against a doctor who per-
formed an operation to which the patient had not consent-
ed."' The court noted that "a person of adult years and in
sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his
own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful
medical treatment."2
A 1983 decision, Barber v. Superior Courts' attempted to
provide solutions to several issues that prior legislation, the
Natural Death Act,' failed to address. In its expansive hold-
ing the Barber court refused to find any civil or criminal lia-
bility on the part of two doctors who terminated their patient's
life support system."3
25. See infra note 70.
26. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 states:
All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtain-
ing safety, happiness, and privacy.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statute making it a criminal offense
to use, counsel or aid in the use of contraceptives). This decision was later af-
firmed and expanded in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a
statute limiting the use of contraceptives to married persons) and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (upholding a woman's right to have an abortion).
28. Griswol4 381 U.S. at 484.
29. Id.
30. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (doctor removed a patient's spleen during an op-
eration that was only supposed to confirm the existence of an ulcer).
31. Id. at 8.
32. I at 9.
33. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Ct. App. 1983).
34. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1992).
35. Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Even though the court found that the doc-
[Vol. 321026
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The defendants in Barber, Dr. Neil Barber and Dr. Robert
Nejdl, had been charged with murder and conspiracy to com-
mit murder in the death of their patient, Clarence Herbert.'
Shortly after being operated on by the defendants, Mr. Her-
bert suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest.37 He was subsequent-
ly revived and placed on life-support equipment.' At the writ-
ten request of Mr. Herbert's family, the doctors removed all of
the patient's life-sustaining equipment, including nasogastric
and intravenous tubes.3 9 Mr. Herbert died six days later."0
The court held that the defendants were not guilty of the
murder charges because it found the termination of Mr.
Herbert's life support was an omission, not an affirmative
act." To employ this legal fiction, the court concluded that
every pulsation of the respirator was a renewal of treatment,
rather than a continuation of treatment. Therefore, the
doctors' refusal to renew the respirator's assistance was an
omission not an act.'
2
In its analysis the court acknowledged a difference be-
tween proportionate and disproportionate care, balancing the
benefits to be gained against the burdens caused by the use of
the life-sustaining treatment.4' The court defined proportion-
ate treatment as "that which ... has at least a reasonable
chance of providing benefits to the patient, [and those] bene-
fits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment."4 1 The
court further held that a doctor has no duty to provide overly
burdensome, disproportionate care. 5
tors acted intentionally and with the knowledge that the patient would die, the de-
fendants were found not guilty because their actions were found to be an omis-
sion. Id.
36. Id. at 486.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 493.
42. Id. at 490.
43. Id. at 491. The court explained the difference in this manner: "[E]ven if
a proposed course of treatment might be extremely painful or intrusive, it would
still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was for complete cure or signif-
icant improvement in the patient's condition." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
1992] 1027
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In Mr. Herbert's case, the court found that the burden's
outweighed the benefits of the life-sustaining treatment be-
cause Mr. Herbert's prognosis was virtually hopeless."6 Thus,
to summarize the analysis, the court found that the doctors'
action in removing the life support system was an omission. It
is an accepted doctrine that there is no criminal liability for an
omission unless there is a duty to act.4 The court found that
there was no duty to act in Mr. Herbert's case because the
treatment was disproportionate. Thus, the doctors' actions
were determined to be lawful.
The Barber court also stated that it viewed "the use of an
intravenous administration of nourishment and fluid, under
the circumstances, as being the same as the use of the respira-
tor or other form of life support equipment."48 Claiming that
the distinction was more emotional than factual, the court
found no difference between the removal of the respirator and
the removal of the nasogastric and intravenous tubes which
had been providing nourishment and hydration. 9
The Barber court voiced its frustration with regard to the
absence of legislation involving incompetent patients and their
right to have their life-support removed.' To remedy this lack
of guidance, the court established three clear guidelines in the
general area of decision making. First, the court found no
prior judicial approval is necessary to remove any
life-sustaining measures." Second, the patient should be the
ultimate decisionmaker whenever possible."' Third, legal
guardianship procedures are not necessary to have a surrogate
become the ultimate decisionmaker
46. Id. at 492.
47. 1 B.E. Witkin & Norman L. Epstein, California Criminal Law § 115 (2d
ed. 1988).
48. Barbe, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 489. The court stated that "there is no clear authority on the issue
of who and under what procedure is to make the final decision." Id. at 492. The
court concluded that the only long term solution to this problem is necessarily
legislative in nature. Id. at 491.
51. Id. at 493. The court stated that "in absence of legislative guidance, we
find no legal requirement that prior judicial approval is necessary before any de-
cision to withdraw treatment can be made." Id.
52. Id. at 492.
53. Id. The court stated: "In the absence of legislation requiring such legal
proceedings, we cannot say that failure to institute such proceedings made
[Vol. 321028
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Regarding the standard to be used by a surrogate in mak-
ing the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment, the Barber
court held that the surrogate must first make every attempt to
ascertain the choice the patient would have made, but, if this is
not possible, the surrogate should be guided by the patient's
best interests. To evaluate the patient's own choice, the court
stated that the surrogate ought to be guided by "his knowledge
of the patient's own desires and feelings, to the extent that
they were expressed before the patient became incompe-
tent."' If this should fail to produce any conclusive evidence,
the surrogate may take into account the "relief of suffering,
the preservation or restoration of functioning and the quality
as well as the extent of life sustained."' Finally, the surrogate
should evaluate the impact of the decision on those people
closest to the patient.'
In 1986 the California courts once again expanded the
class of persons able to exercise a right to die in Battling v.
Superior Court,7 The court in Bartling upheld the right of a
competent seventy year old man, who had not been diagnosed
as terminally ill, to have his life support system removed.-
When Mr. Bartling entered Glendale Adventist Medical Center
in April 1984, to have a biopsy performed on a malignant lung
tumor, he was already suffering from emphysema, arterioscle-
rosis, and an abdominal aneurysm." During the operation
one of his lungs deflated.' When the lung failed to reinflate,
Mr. Bartling was placed on a respirator.6'
Mr. Bartling filed a complaint in June of 1984, after his
requests to have himself removed from the respirator were ig-
nored and after several attempts to actually physically remove
petitioners' conduct unlawful. Whether such proceedings are to be required in the
future is again a question for the Legislature to decide." Id. at 492-93.
54. Id at 493.
55. Id Regarding Mr. Herbert, the court stated that "[t]here was evidence
that Mr. Herbert had, prior to his incapacitation, expressed to his wife his feeling
that he 'would not want to be kept alive by machines .... " Id.
56. Id.
57. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (CL App. 1984).
58. Id. at 220.
59. See Elizabeth Scherer, Recent Case, Battling v. Superior Cout: The Right to
Die. The Right to HeaL" Conflicts in the Batling Decision. 12 West St. U. L Rev. 907,
907-08 (1984).
60. Batling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
61. Id
1992] 1029
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himself failed.' In the complaint, Mr. Bartling sought an in-
junction restraining the hospital and doctors from continuing
unwanted medical treatment.' In addition, he requested dam-
ages for battery, violation of state and federal constitutional
rights, breach of a fiduciary duty owed him by the doctors and
hospital, intentional infliction of emotional distress and con-
spiracy.'
Attached to the complaint were several documents.65 Mr.
Bartling had executed a living will which stated that if there
were "no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme
physical or mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to
die ... ."' Mr. Bartling had also included a Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care appointing Mrs. Bartling as Mr.
Bartling's attorney in fact.67 In addition, Mr. Bartling attached
releases, signed by Mr. and Mrs. Bartling and Mr. Bartling's
daughter, which relieved the hospital and doctors from civil
liability."
Citing Cobbs, Barber and the California Natural Death Act,
the Bartling court held that the right to the removal of life sup-
port equipment is not limited to comatose, terminally-ill pa-
tients.' Recognizing the patient's right to privacy and self
determination as constitutionally grounded rights," the court
held that these rights outweighed the state's interest in pro-
tecting against suicide: "If the right of the patient to self deter-
62. Id. The doctors treating Mr. Bartling placed his wrists in soft restraints to
prevent him from accidentally or deliberately disconnecting himself from the respi-
rator. Mr. Bartling's requests that these restraints be removed were denied. Id.
63. Id. at 221-23.
64. Id. at 221.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 224. The trial court made several findings of fact that were later
used in the appellate court's analysis: "(1) Mr. Bartling's illnesses were serious but
not terminal and had not been diagnosed as such; (2) although Mr. Bartling was
attached to a respirator to facilitate breathing, he was not in a vegetative state
and was not comatose; and (3) Mr. Bartling was competent in the legal sense." Id.
at 223.
70. Id. at 225:
The right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment
has its origins in the constitutional right of privacy. This right is spe-
cifically guaranteed by the California Constitution (art. I, § 1) and has
been found to exist in the 'penumbra' of rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
1030 [Vol. 32
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mination as to his own medical treatment is to have any mean-
ing at all, it must be paramount to the interests of the patient's
hospital and doctors.""
Rejecting the state's argument that the removal of Mr.
Bartling's respirator was tantamount to aiding suicide, the
court stated that the state only had an interest in protecting
against "irrational self-destruction. "" The court held that Mr.
Bartling's decision was a rational refusal of treatment and that
"[tihere is no connection between the conduct here in issue
and any state concern to prevent suicide."74
A highly publicized 1986 case that is very similar factually
to Bartling is Bouvia v. Superior Court.7- In Bouvia the court
found that a person's right to privacy encompasses a virtually
absolute right to refuse medical treatment, even when the
treatment may be life-saving and its absence leads to an earlier
death. 6 At the time of trial, Elizabeth Bouvia was a twenty -
eight year old woman who had been afflicted with cerebral
palsy since birth.77 Although she had been bedridden for most
of her life, Ms. Bouvia had been married and had earned a
college degree."
Ms. Bouvia's inability to care for herself or earn a living
had forced her to reside in a public hospital." While at the
hospital she developed chronic, severe, arthritis and was in
constant pain despite periodic morphine injections.' Against
Ms. Bouvia's wishes, the hospital inserted a nasogastric tube
into her stomach to provide her with nourishment." Conse-
71. ld. at 225.
72. Id. The court found that the doctors had not brought Mr. Bartling's
death by unnatural means. Rather, they had hastened his inevitable death by natu-
ral causes. Id.
73. Id. at 226 (quoting Superindendant of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (Mass. 1977)).
74. Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
426 n.11 (Mass. 1977)).
75. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
76. Id. at 302.
77. Id. at 299.
78. Id. at 300.
79. Id. Ms. Bouvia's husband left her and she had lived with her parents
until they informed her that they could no longer care for her. Id.
80. Id. at 300.
81. Id. On several occasions Ms. Bouvia had expressed the desire to die. Her
treating physicians thought that she was attempting to commit suicide when they
discovered that she was not eating enough and was attempting to starve herself to
1992] 1031
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
quently, Ms. Bouvia filed a complaint with the court requesting
the removal of the tube from her body.'
Using the same analysis found in the Bartling case, the
Bouvia court held the right to refuse medical treatment is vir-
tually an absolute right." Criticizing the trial court's evalua-
tion of the motives behind Ms. Bouvia's decision to exercise
her rights, the court stated that "[i]f a right exists, it matters
not what 'motivates' its exercise. "' Thus, the court did not
find it necessary to evaluate the level of rationality behind the
refusal of medical treatment. Upholding Ms. Bouvia's right to
have the feeding tube removed, the court stated that it "cer-
tainly is not illegal or immoral to prefer a natural, albeit soon-
er, death than a drugged life attached to a mechanical de-
vice. "'
The most recent California decision involving the right to
terminate life-support is Conservatorship of Drabick" decided in
1988. Relying to a great extent upon the Barber case, the
Drabick court held that the right to refuse treatment survives
incompetence and may be executed on behalf of the incompe-
tent patient by a court-appointed conservator.87 The court
found that California Probate Code section 2355,' which al-
lows a conservator to make health care decisions for a
conservatee, authorized such a decision by a conservator, if it
death. ld.
82. Id. at 298. Ms. Bouvia had previously petitioned a court in Riverside,
California to allow her to "starve[] herself to death" while in a public hospital.
She was denied judicial assistance and she abandoned an effort to appeal. Id. at
300.
83. Id. at 302. The Bouvia court held that:
It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it
a legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or
judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics com-
mittees or courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that,
being a competent adult, is her's [sic] alone.
Id. at 305.
84. Id. at 306.
85. 1d
86. 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (CL App. 1988).
87. Id. at 854. However, the court stated that "this opinion should not be
read as suggesting that conservatorship proceedings are always necessary." Id. at
848.
88. Cal. Prob. Code § 2355 (West 1991). This section states in part that "the
conservator has the exclusive authority to give consent for such medical treatment
to be performed on the conservatee as the conservator in good faith based on
medical advice determines to be necessary."
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was made in good faith, based upon medical advice and in the
conservatee's best interest.
In addition, the court specified that the type of medical
advice that would support a decision to forego life- sustaining
treatment must include the "prognosis that there is no reason-
able possibility of return to cognitive and sapient life."89 Re-
garding the good faith determination, the court noted that the
decision must not be affected by a material conflict of interest.
The conservator must consider all available information rele-
vant to, the conservatee's best interest, including a directive
under the Natural Death Act and prior informal statements by
the conservatee.'
The Drabick case involved a forty-four year old man who
had existed in a persistent vegetative state following an auto-
mobile accident which occurred in 1983."' Although Mr.
Drabick's condition was not terminal, his conservator peti-
tioned the superior court for an order to withhold all medical
treatment, including procedures utilized to deliver nutrition
and hydration.' The superior court denied the petition on
the ground that continued feeding was in the patient's best
interest. The court of appeals reversed, stating that prior judi-
cial approval was not necessary in the discontinuation of
life-sustaining treatment."
The court acknowledged that "to claim that [Mr.
Drabick's] 'right to choose' survives incompetence is a legal
fiction at best," however, "it does not by any means follow that
he has no protected, fundamental interest in the medical treat-
ment decisions that affect him."" The court determined it
89. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 842.
92. Id. at 842-43.
93. 1& at 860. The Drabick court stated that a conservator who has been
appointed under Probate Code section 2355 to make medical decisions does not
need further judicial approval for decisions to terminate life-sustaining measures:
This case arose because the conservator chose to seek the [superior]
court's approval. The conservator did not file his petition because
there was opposition but, in his own words, 'to obtain a court order
that would remove any doubts about the legality or propriety of such
action and, thereby, protect the medical care providers from potential
action - legal, administrative, other - against them.'
Id. at 850.
94. I at 855.
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could best preserve the rights of the incompetent patient by
allowing a conservator to act as a surrogate decisionmaker
Regarding evidence of prior statements made by Mr.
Drabick that he would never want to be kept alive by artificial
means, the court held that the statements should not "compel
either the continuance or cessation of treatment in a particular
case," rather the statements should be considered as evidence
of intent." Specifically, the court stated that the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard," adopted by some courts to
determine the wishes of the patient, presented "several serious
problems."" Thus, the Drabick court directly criticized the
standard upheld in 1990 by the United States Supreme Court
in its first right to die decision, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health."
On January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was severely
injured in an automobile accident."° She was found "lying
face down in a ditch without detectable respiratory or cardiac
function."'' Although paramedics were able to restore her
heartbeat and breathing in a matter of twelve to fourteen min-
utes, Ms. Cruzan sustained permanent brain damage."° After
three weeks in a coma, Ms. Cruzan "progressed to an uncon-
scious state in which she was able to orally ingest some nutri-
tion ""' but further rehabilitative efforts proved un-
availing."° Nancy Cruzan existed in what is commonly re-
ferred to as a persistent vegetative state." She exhibited lim-
95. Id.
96. I& at 856.
97. Id. at 856. The Court describes this standard as "the position that an
incompetent patient's hypothetical desire to forego life-sustaining treatment must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence or some other standard and, when so
proved, is [found] conclusive." Id.
98. Id. at 856. The court describes three problems: (1) there is no authority,
other than cases on the subject, to support the idea that a person can exercise or
waive a fundamental right unintentionally through informal statements, (2) there
would be no consistent basis for a decision when a patient had been silent on the
matter, and (3) the approach is contrary to the Probate Code section 2355 which
allows a conservator's decision to be absolute, whether or not the conservatee ob-
jects. Id. at 856-57.
99. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
100. Id. at 2845.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Medical experts testified that Ms. Cruzan could live for thirty more
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ited motor reflexes, but had virtually no chance of regaining
any significant cognitive function."°
Upon learning this devastating information, Ms. Cruzan's
family sought a court order directing the withdrawal of their
daughter's artificial feeding and hydration equipment.' 7 The
Cruzans' petition was successful at the trial court level."
However, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, stating that
Ms. Cruzan's parents lacked the authority to effectuate the
request to remove the life-sustaining measures because there
was no clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's desires."°9
Although it recognized a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment,"0 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Missouri Supreme Court decision
in Cruzan."' The Court expressed, implicitly and explicitly, a
general desire to defer to state judgments in the area of termi-
nation of life- sustaining medical treatment."'
The United States Supreme Court noted that "[a]lthough
many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is
encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy,
[this court has] never so held."" Instead, the Court stated
that the issue was "more properly analyzed in terms of a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest.""' Thus, the United
States Supreme Court favored the liberty interest analysis over
the right of privacy analysis on which California law in this
area is based.
years in this state. Id. at 2845 n.1.
106. Id. at 2845.
107. Id. at 2846.
108. Id. at 2846.
109. Id. The evidence that the Court found to be inconclusive was of com-
ments made by Ms. Cruzan "in [a] somewhat serious conversation with a
housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfway normally." Id.
110. Id. at 2842.
111. Id. at 2856.
112. Id. "All of the reasons . . . for allowing Missouri to require clear and
convincing evidence of the patient's wishes lead us to conclude that the state may
choose to defer only to those wishes, rather than confide the decision to close
family members." Id See The Supreme Cour4 1989 Term: Leading Case; 104 Harv.
L Rev. 129 (1990).
113. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
114. Id.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
California case law regarding right-to-die issues has far
surpassed current applicable legislation. The courts have estab-
lished a virtually absolute right to refuse medical treatment,
including life-sustaining treatment. However, the present legis-
lation totally ignores two categories of patients: (1) the compe-
tent patients who are not terminally ill, but refuse
life-sustaining treatment; and (2) the incompetent patients who
never created a living will or designated another person to
make health care decisions for him.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Legislation
The California Natural Death Act and the Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care have not provided the guidance
that is necessary to lessen or alleviate litigation in the area of
death and dying in the California courts. It is possible for a
non-comatose, fully competent person to indicate his desire to
terminate life-support through the use of a Natural Death Di-
rective. However, there is no legislation regulating the ability
of a competent, non- terminally ill, person to have his life sup-
port terminated. Additionally, there is no legislation regulating
a comatose or incompetent person who was not able to create
a Natural Death Directive or a Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care before he was rendered incompetent.
B. Case Law Involving Competent Patients
In its haste to establish an absolute right of personal au-
tonomy, the courts have ignored the distinction between ra-
tional and irrational decisions by competent patients to termi-
nate their own life-sustaining treatment. The court readily
admits that the state has an interest in preserving life and in
the prevention of suicide."' Yet, it holds that the state's inter-
est is limited to "'irrational self- destruction. ' " "
115. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Ct. App. 1986). There
are four state interests recognized by the court: (1) the preservation of life, (2)
the prevention of suicide, (3) the protection of innocent third parties, and (4) the
maintenance of the ethical standards of the medical profession. Id.
116. Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220, 226 (Ct. App. 1984)
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Current case law in California, regarding the rights of
competent patients, is derived from the decisions in the
Batling case and the Bouvia case. Bartling established the right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment for competent, non terminal-
ly ill, adult patients and created a judicially recognized distinc-
tion between this right and suicide."' Bouvia elaborated on
Batling, holding that the right to refuse treatment is absolute
and because of this, the courts would not evaluate the motiva-
tion underlying the patient's decision to terminate his own
life."' Supporting both of these decisions is the holding in
Barber, which states that no prior judicial approval is necessary
in any type of situation involving the termination of a patient's
life- sustaining treatment."9
The court in Batling placed emphasis on the patient's
right of self-determination. It stated that if this right was to
have any meaning at all it should be paramount to the inter-
ests of the doctors and the hospital.'" Rejecting the argu-
ment raised by the doctors and the hospital that terminating
Mr. Bartling's respirator would be tantamount to aiding sui-
cide, the court stated that it found a "real distinction between
the self infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination
against artificial life-support or radical surgery."'
Black's Law Dictionary defines suicide as "self- destruction;
the deliberate termination of one's own life."" Although
there is no mention of cognitive reasoning in the standard
legal definition of suicide, the Bartling court used a rationality
test to distinguish suicide from the right to refuse treatment. A
rational decision by a patient to terminate his own
life-sustaining measures and ultimately, his life, would not be
considered suicide and would not implicate the state's inter-
ests, because the court found that the state only had an inter-
est in irrational suicide. 23
(quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11
(Mass. 1977)).
117. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
119. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 484, 493 (Ct. App. 1983).
120. Battling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court stated that "the right of a com-
petent adult patient to refuse medical treatment is a constitutionally guaranteed
right which must not be abridged." Id.
121. Id. at 225-26 (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (N.J. 1976)).
122. Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
123. Battling 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court stated: -[w]hat we consider
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The Bouvia court effectively eliminated the Batling ratio-
nality test by holding that the right to refuse life- sustaining
treatment is absolute. As the court stated, "if a right exists, it
matters not what 'motivates' its exercise."2 4 Thus, the court
held that it could not base its determination of Ms. Bouvia's
decision on her rationality, because it was excluded from evalu-
ating the decision at all. 12 -
The analysis of the Batling court was well supported. The
Bouvia court relied upon the distinction between suicide and
the right to refuse medical treatment created in Batling. How-
ever, Bouvia also rejected the rationality test used to create this
distinction. Without the rationality test, there is no way to
determine if a patient is actively advocating his own death or
passively refusing treatment. The purpose of the rationality test
was to avoid ill- considered, hastily-made decisions to terminate
one's own life, which is "suicide."" Without this test, there
are no existing safeguards protecting the competent patient
from making an irreversible decision he may not have been
prepared to make.
California case law adds another element to this problem;
the patient does not have to be terminally ill to have his
life-sustaining treatment terminated. 7 As in the Bartling and
Bouvia cases, a patient could have a potential life expectancy of
any number of years. Although a competent adult patient de-
ciding to forego treatment is presumptively rational, this pre-
sumption should be rebuttable if the patient is deciding to
forego the possibility of a potentially productive life.
Due to the length of time it took the legal system to ad-
dress their complaints, the patients in Bantling and Bouvia had
more than enough time to reflect upon the consequences of
their decisions. It is interesting to note that after finally being
granted the right to disconnect her life-sustaining equipment,
Ms. Bouvia changed her mind and decided to postpone her
death.'" In addition, Mr. Bartling's doctors questioned his
here is a competent, rational decision to refuse treatment when death is inevitable
and the treatment offers no hope of cure or preservation of life.'" Id. (quoting
Saihkeitz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11). See also supra notes 52-66 and accompanying
text.
124. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Ct. App. 1986).
125. I&
126. Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
127. Bailling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
128. See L.A. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, § 2, at. 3 (quoting one of Bouvia's
1038 [Vol. 32
RIGHT TO REFUSE
ability to make a meaningful decision because of his vacilla-
tion.' " Apparently, Mr. Bartling had expressed to his doctors
and nurses his desire to live and to not be taken off the respi-
rator." The nurses testified about instances in which Mr.
Bartling's ventilator tube had become disconnected and he had
signalled frantically for them to reconnect it."'
Yet, these cases eliminated the requirement of prior judi-
cial approval. The potential now exists for the ill- considered,
hastily-made decisions that the rationality test was implement-
ed to prevent. Without some type of safeguard, there are many
patients likely to become victims of their own irrationality.
If the state is going to enforce its interest in preventing
irrational self-destruction, it must be allowed to evaluate the
reasons behind a patient's decision to terminate life-sustaining
treatment, especially in instances in which the patient's condi-
tion is not terminal. Thus, legislation must be implemented
which would govern the competent patient's right to terminate
life-sustaining treatment.
C. Case Law Involving Incompetent Patients
The courts have attempted to adjudicate the rights of
incompetents in the absence of legislative authority. To its
credit, the Barber court stated that "the long term solution to
this problem is necessarily legislative in nature."' Neverthe-
less, the courts found that the rights of a patient survive in-
competency and those rights may be enacted on the patient's
behalf by a surrogate decisionmaker"'
As the first California case involving an incompetent pa-
tient whose life-support system was removed, Barber laid the
groundwork and set the standard to be later used in Drabick.
Although the surrogate in Drabick was a court- appointed con-
servator,'" the decisionmakers in Barber had not acquired pri-
or judicial approval of the termination of the patient's life sup-
attorney's as stating that suicide remains "an option [Bouvia] holds in abeyance,"
because "she wants to go out with some dignity").
129. Battling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Ct. App. 1983).
133. See supra notes 86-98.
134. Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 842.
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port system. However, the court stated that "in the absence of
legislation requiring such legal proceedings, we cannot say that
failure to institute such proceedings make petitioners' conduct
unlawful."" The court indicated that the legislature was the
appropriate body to determine the need and implementation
of such procedures."" As of yet, the legislature has not re-
sponded.
In addition, the case law is not in agreement as to the
determinative test to be used by the surrogate to guide him in
his decision. The Barber court cited a report of a presidential
commission investigating the legal and ethical issues involved
the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment.'37 The report
stated that the surrogate "ought to be guided in his or her
decisions first by his knowledge of the patient's own desires
and feelings, to the extent that they were expressed before the
patient became incompetent."'" If the incompetent's wishes
are not known, then the surrogate should act in the best inter-
ests of the patient.'39
In contrast, the Drabick court relied upon the section of
the California Probate Code 4 under which the conservator
had been appointed to develop a standard for the surrogate
decisionmaker. The Drabick court rejected the need for an
initial evaluation of the patient's choice and held that the con-
servator should only be guided by the patient's best
interest.' The Probate Code requires a conservator to make
a good faith determination regarding the conservatee's
treatment based upon medical advice and the necessity of the
treatment.'
135. Barbe, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
136. Ud at 492-93.
137. Id. at 493 (citing President's Commission for Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego
Life-Sustaining Treatment, Report on Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treat-
ment Decisions at 132- 39 (March 1983) [hereinafter President's Commission]).
138. Id. (citing President's Commission at 132).
139. Id. at 493.
140. Cal. Prob. Code § 2355 (West 1991). See supra note 88.
141. Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 855 (Ct. App. 1988).
However, the court acknowledged that "[t]o delegate an incompetent person's
right to choose inevitably runs the risk that the surrogate's choices will not be the
same as the incompetent's hypothetical, subjective choices." Id.
142. Cal. Prob. Code § 2355 (West 1991). See supra note 88.
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The Drabick court specifically stated that the patient's pri-
or informal statements, alone, cannot compel either-the contin-
uance or cessation of treatment."" The probable reason the
court held the conservator's decision to supersede the known
desires of the patient, is that California Probate Code section
2355 gives the conservator exclusive authority to make deci-
sions regarding medical treatment "whether or not the
conservatee objects."44
Thus, the different standards used by the two cases can be
reconciled by focusing on the Drabick court's need to adhere
to the Probate Code. Although the surrogate in Drabick is
court appointed, the court states that "this opinion should not
be read as suggesting that conservatorship proceedings are
always necessary." 4 - Similarly, the standard used by the con-
servator in Drabick should not be considered a general rule
applicable to all situations involving the termination of an
incompetent patient's life support system. If the conservator-
ship proceedings are not necessary, then the restrictions gov-
erning the conservator's behavior are not necessary either.
Therefore, the standard set in Barber should be the pre-
vailing standard used by surrogates in California. This stan-
dard, which gives deference to the known opinion of the in-
competent patient, insures that the rights and interest of the
patient are adequately represented. As has been previously
stated, the absolute right to refuse medical treatment belongs
to the patient and not the surrogate.By determining that this
right survives incompetence, the court did not take the right
away from the patient and give it to his surrogate. Instead, the
courts gave the surrogate the right to act on behalf of the pa-
tient. The consequence of an improperly considered decision
by a surrogate to terminate the patient's life-sustaining treat-
ment is irreversible. Therefore, it is only proper that the surro-
gate make the primary determination of the patient's prefer-
ence regarding his own death.
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
standard advocating clear and convincing evidence of an
143. Drabich, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (Ct. App. 1988). The court felt that the
.conservator may consider the conservatee's known preferences together with all
other information bearing on the conservatee's best interests." Id.
144. Cal. Prob. Code § 2355 (West 1991).
145. Drabich, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 848. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
10411992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
incompetent's desire to die.' In support of this high stan-
dard set by the Missouri Legislature, the Court cited the state's
interest in guarding "against potential abuses in such situa-
tions. " "' The Court acknowledged that "an erroneous deci-
sion to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is not susceptible of
correction," yet an erroneous decision to not withdraw
life-support would retain the status quo. 4 In addition, the
Court did not hold that the state must accept the substituted
judgment of close family members because "there is no auto-
matic assurance that the view of close family members will
necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had
she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while
competent."'
The effect of Cruzan on California case law has yet to be
determined. First, the United States Supreme Court clearly
stated that it did not accept the right of privacy analysis used
by California in the development of the right to refuse medical
treatment.Y Yet, it did find the same right to exist under a
constitutionally recognized liberty interest. Second, the Court
held that Missouri was not constitutionally obligated to accept
the decisions made by surrogates, and yet, it did not hold that
these decisions were unconstitutionall."5 Third, although the
Court held Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard
to be constitutional, it did not hold this standard to be the
only constitutionally acceptable standard.' In summary, the
Court did not explicitly adopt or reject any of the standards
presently existing in California.
In the Cruzan decision, the United States Supreme Court
indicated its desire to minimize the interest in constitutional
litigation in the area of death and dying, "so that states can
continue to experiment and discern the best means for han-
146. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856
(1990). See supra notes 99113 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 2853.
148. Id. at 2854.
149. Id. at 2856.
150. Id. at 2851 n.7.
151. Id. at 2856. The Court stated that "there is no automatic assurance that
the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's
would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation
while competent." Id.
152. Id. at 2841.
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dling decisions to terminate treatment for incompetent pa-
tients."' The California Legislature needs to respond to this
challenge. There must be some sort of standard set to deter-
mine who can act as a surrogate. The legislature should adopt
a test similar to the one articulated in Barber, specifying the
standard to be used by a surrogate when deciding to terminate
a patient's life- sustaining equipment.
V. PROPOSAL
As stated earlier, legislation in California regarding an
individual's ability to express his right to die is severely limited
in its application. The present legislation needs to be updated
and expanded to include the guidelines advocated in current
case law.
A. Competent, Non-Terminally Ill, Patients
The current legislation allows a competent, terminally- ill
person to write a Natural Death Act and have his life- sustain-
ing treatment terminated. Case law has stated that it is possible
for a non-terminally ill, competent person to also have his life
support legally terminated. However, there is no legislation
regulating the right of the non- terminally ill person. Although
a competent adult patient deciding to forego treatment is pre-
sumptively rational, this presumption should be rebuttable if
the patient is deciding to forego the possibility of a potentially
productive life.
The courts have hindered the state's ability to prevent
irrational self-destruction by effectively eliminating all require-
ments that the patient's decision meet a test of rationality. The
potential now exists for the ill- considered, hastily-made deci-
sions that the rationality test was implemented to prevent.
Without some type of safeguard there are many patients likely
to become victims of their own irrationality. Therefore, a man-
datory waiting period should be instituted.
If a non-terminally ill patient expresses the desire to have
his life-support removed, he should be required to wait a speci-
fied period of time before his desire is granted. The irre-
153. The Supreme Court 1989 Ter: Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 257, 266
(1990).
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versible nature of the decision that the patient is making war-
rants this requirement. A waiting period would give the patient
time to reconsider his options. Additionally, the patient's phy-
sicians and relatives could use this time to provide counseling
for the patient. However, if the patient still wishes to die after
the waiting period has expired, then his wishes should be
granted.
In justification of the waiting period, the slight indignity
suffered by some patients would be compensated for by the
number of lives saved. In addition, the time that these patients
would have to wait will ultimately be far less than the amount
of time it would take to have the court's adjudicate the case of
every potentially suicidal patient. At the end of the waiting
period, the state's interest no longer justifies further interven-
tion and the patient will have his wishes respected.
The legislators could protect the state's interest in the
prevention of irrational self-destruction by requiring that the
patient's decision meet the standards of legally effective in-
formed consent." An evaluation could be made during the
mandatory waiting period to determine whether the patient
was making an informed decision. The law generallyrequires a
patient's informed consent in the process of all health care
decisionmaking 5 A patient's decision to forego life-support
should not be treated any differently. The consequences of a
patient's decision to terminate his own life support system are
especially compelling, because the decision to die is irrevers-
ible. Therefore, to ensure that this decision is not made irratio-
nally, the legislation should mandate that the patient is ade-
quately informed.
154. See Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right to Die; An Exetrise of Informed
Consent Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1367 (1990). In this article, the author argues that granting a right to die under
the right to privacy could lead to involuntary euthanasia, suicide and diagnostic
mistakes. Id. at 1389. The author states that the "decision to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment is soundly supported by the common law doctrine of informed
consent. That decision involves medical, ethical, and philosophical questions which
are better regulated by legislation than by judicial decree." Id. at 1395.
155. See George J. Annas & Joan E. Densberger, Competence to Refuse Medical
Treatment: Autonomy vs. Paternalism. 15 U. Tol. L Rev. 561, 561-62 (1984). The law
presumes that every competent adult is capable of making decisions for himself
unless adjudged otherwise. Id. at 565. In the medical context, the law requires le-
gally effective informed consent. Id.
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There are three elements of informed consent: the
patient's capacity to decide, the voluntary nature of the deci-
sion and the physician's disclosure of information." The ca-
pacity of determination should be guided by two consider-
ations; (1) Whether the patient's decision was well thought out,
consistent with his values, goals, and religious beliefs; or al-
ternatively, whether the decision was hastily made, in reaction
to severe depression, pain or personal catastrophe (2) Whether
a reasonable person would determine that the patient's life was
worth living.' The voluntariness requirement would mini-
mize potentially negative influences, such as the views of rela-
tives, doctors and society. Disclosure by the physician should
provide the patient with sufficient information regarding his
present medical status, any treatment that could possibly im-
prove his condition and the expectations he could have for his
future.
B. Comatose or Incompetent Patients Who Have Failed to Create a
Living Will of Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
Current case law in California grants non-terminally ill,
incompetent patients the right to have a surrogate enforce
their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.' However,
there is no existing legislation regarding who may act as a
surrogate and by what standards the surrogate should make
the decision. This proposal suggests that the irreversible nature
of the decision mandates legislation requiring that the surro-
gate be court-appointed. The legislation should include a stan-
dard test to be used by the surrogate which would require an
initial evaluation of the patient's desires regarding his condi-
tion. If the patient's wishes cannot be ascertained, the surro-
gate may make his decision in the best interest of the patient.
156. Id. at 568. The doctrine of informed consent was formulated in
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
157. See Martha Alys Matthews, Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's
Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment. 75 Cal. L Rev. 707, 754 (1987). Matthews
advocates a test to be used by the courts to determine the competency of the pa-
tient. This test is based solely upon the capacity of the patient to make the deci-
sion and involves evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the patient's deci-
sion and the type of future the patient might have. Id. at 754-56.
158. Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Ct. App. 1988). See supra
notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
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Persons who wish to act as a patient's surrogate should be
required to petition the court. Preference should be given to
family members and close relatives because of their presumed
familiarity with the patient. Other persons petitioning to be-
come a surrogate should be required to submit a document to
the court explaining their relationship with the patient and
their reasons for wanting to be the surrogate decisionmaker.
In its determination of who will act as surrogate, the court
should consider the petitioner's familiarity with the patient, as
well as the ability to view the patient's situation objectively.
With close relatives there is always the potential that they may
be overly influenced by the patient's pain and suffering. In
addition, the court should not ignore the possibility that a
surrogate could benefit from the death of the patient and thus,
wish to hasten its occurrence. Although it is impossible for the
court to ascertain the motives of every petitioner requesting
the termination of a patient's life-sustaining treatment, it
should make a concerted effort through the use of its investi-
gative officers to protect the patient.
The standards to be used by the surrogates should be
incorporated into the Probate Code. The new statute should
resemble the sections governing the powers and duties of
guardians'" and conservators.'" The reason that the leg-
islature needs to create a new set of standards for surrogate
decisionmakers is that California Probate Code section 2355,
which discusses the medical treatment of conservatees and
wards adjudicated to lack capacity to give informed consent,
gives the conservator and guardian exclusive authority to make
decisions regardless of the patient's preference.6 Thus, these
statutes give the guardian and conservator the ability to ignore
the desires of the patient.
In contrast, the surrogate deciding to terminate the
life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent patient must give
159. Cal. Prob. Code §§ 1500-1601 (West 1991).
160. Id. §§ 1800-1910.
161. Id. at § 2355 (a). This code states:
IT]he conservator has the exclusive authority to give consent for such
medical treatment to be performed on the conservatee as the conser-
vator in good faith based on medical advice determines to be neces-
sary and the conservator may require the conservatee to receive such
medical treatment whether or not the conservatee objects.
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evidence of the patient's desires regarding his condition the
utmost priority. The court held in Drabick that the right to
refuse treatment survives incompetency and, that the patient
can have a surrogate enforce this right.62 The court did not
transfer the patient's right to the surrogate. Instead, the court
gave the surrogate the right to act on behalf of the patient.
Therefore, it is the patient's right and the surrogate should
make every effort to ascertain and enforce the patient's opin-
ions and desires.
There is a wide variety of sources from which the surro-
gate could discern the patient's opinion of the prolongation of
his life due to medical technology. An ineffective Natural
Death Act directive may not be legally binding, but that does
not affect the validity of the patient's intent when creating the
document. In fact, if a directive is available it should be consid-
ered the primary source of information. Comments made by
the patient regarding his desire to be kept alive or to not be
kept alive must be analyzed with regard to the circumstances
under which they were spoken. It is possible that these com-
ments do not reflect the patient's true desires and were merely
a reaction to a particular event.
If there is no reliable source of the patient's intent, the
surrogate must make the decision in the best interest of the
patient. The surrogate should base his evaluation on his famil-
iarity with the patient; his knowledge of the patient's values
and goals, religious and philosophical convictions, and general
way of life. The surrogate should also evaluate the patient's
medical situation. Such factors as the relief of suffering, the
possibility of preservation or restoration of functioning and
the quality, as well as the extent, of life sustained should be
considered. In addition, the surrogate may take into account
the impact of the decision on the people closest to the patient.
By advocating judicial approval of the surrogate, the pro-
posed legislation would ensure that a sufficient evaluation
would be made of the surrogate's familiarity with the patient.
In addition, the rights of the patient would be protected by the
enactment of the suggested standard to be used by the surro-
gate in his decision.
162. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 855. See also supra notes 86- 98 and accompany-
ing texL
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VI. CONCLUSION
Modern medical technology has made possible the artifi-
cial prolongation of life beyond natural limits. Although the
California Legislature has stated its awareness of this fact, its
enactments have proved to be limited in their application. In
the absence of applicable litigation, the California courts have
been forced to decide several cases involving the termination
of life-sustaining measures. The case law that has been devel-
oped has created rights for competent and incompetent pa-
tients without establishing the guidelines on how to implement
these rights.
The legislation proposed in this comment attempts to
remedy the current lack of guidance in the area of death and
dying. Regarding the judicially-created right of a competent
patient to forego life-sustaining treatment, the state should
reassert its interest in the prevention of irrational
self-destruction, and institute a mandatory waiting period for
all non-terminally ill, competent patients who want to forego
life support. Additionally, the patient's decision must meet the
standards of legally effective informed consent. The courts
have also granted incompetent patients the right to have a
surrogate act on his or her behalf. In order to protect this
right, the proposed legislation requires that the surrogate be
court appointed. In addition, the surrogate must make every
effort to determine the desires of the patient and, if this is not
possible, must act in the patient's best interest.
Kathleen M. Malone
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